Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2 — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
ELEMENTS OF REVENGE.—The word “revenge” is spoken so quickly that it
almost seems as if it could not contain more than one conceptual and
emotional root. Hence we are still at pains to find this root. Our
economists, in the same way, have never wearied of scenting a similar
unity in the word “value,” and of hunting after the primitive root idea of
value. As if all words were not pockets, into which this or that or
several things have been stuffed at once! So “revenge” is now one thing,
now another, and sometimes more composite. Let us first distinguish that
defensive counter-blow, which we strike, almost unconsciously, even at
inanimate objects (such as machinery in motion) that have hurt us. The
notion is to set a check to the object that has hurt us, by bringing the
machine to a stop. Sometimes the force of this counter-blow, in order to
attain its object, will have to be strong enough to shatter the machine.
If the machine be too strong to be disorganised by one man, the latter
will all the same strike the most violent blow he can—as a sort of last
attempt. We behave similarly towards persons who hurt us, at the immediate
sensation of the hurt. If we like to call this an act of revenge, well and
good: but we must remember that here self-preservation alone has set its
cog-wheels of reason in motion, and that after all we do not think of the
doer of the injury but only of ourselves. We act without any idea of doing
injury in return, only with a view to getting away safe and sound.—It
needs time to pass in thought from oneself to one’s adversary and ask
oneself at what point he is most vulnerable. This is done in the second
variety of revenge, the preliminary idea of which is to consider the
vulnerability and susceptibility of the other. The intention then is to
give pain. On the other hand, the idea of securing himself against further
injury is in this case so entirely outside the avenger’s horizon, that he
almost regularly brings about his own further injury and often foresees it
in cold blood. If in the first sort of revenge it was the fear of a second
blow that made the counter-blow as strong as possible, in this case there
is an almost complete indifference to what one’s adversary will do: the
strength of the counter-blow is only determined by what he has _already_
done to us. Then what has he done? What profit is it to us if he is now
suffering, after we have suffered through him? This is a case of
readjustment, whereas the first act of revenge only serves the purpose of
self-preservation. It may be that through our adversary we have lost
property, rank, friends, children—these losses are not recovered by
revenge, the readjustment only concerns a subsidiary loss which is added
to all the other losses. The revenge of readjustment does not preserve one
from further injury, it does not make good the injury already
suffered—except in one case. If our honour has suffered through our
adversary, revenge can restore it.