Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
THE JUDGE AND EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—“One should behave as a man of
honour even towards the devil and pay his debts,” said an old soldier,
when the story of Faust had been related to him in rather fuller detail.
“Hell is the right place for Faust!” “You are terrible, you men!” cried
his wife; “how can that be? After all, his only fault was having no ink in
his ink-stand! It is indeed a sin to write with blood, but surely for that
such a handsome man ought not to burn in Hell-fire?”
43.
PROBLEM OF THE DUTY OF TRUTH.—Duty is an imperious sentiment that forces
us to action. We call it good, and consider it outside the pale of
discussion. The origin, limits, and justification of duty we will not
debate or allow to be debated. But the thinker considers everything an
evolution and every evolution a subject for discussion, and is accordingly
without duty so long as he is merely a thinker. As such, he would not
recognise the duty of seeing and speaking the truth; he would not _feel_
the sentiment at all. He asks, whence comes it and whither will it go? But
even this questioning appears to him questionable. Surely, however, the
consequence would be that the thinker’s machinery would no longer work
properly if he could really feel himself unencumbered by duty in the
search for knowledge? It would appear, then, that for fuel the same
element is necessary as must be investigated by means of the
machine.—Perhaps the formula will be: granted there were a duty of
recognising truth, what is then the truth in regard to every other kind of
duty?—But is not a hypothetical sense of duty a contradiction in terms?
44.
GRADES OF MORALS.—Morality is primarily a means of preserving the
community and saving it from destruction. Next it is a means of
maintaining the community on a certain plane and in a certain degree of
benevolence. Its motives are fear and hope, and these in a more coarse,
rough, and powerful form, the more the propensity towards the perverse,
one-sided, and personal still persists. The most terrible means of
intimidation must be brought into play so long as milder forms have no
effect and that twofold species of preservation cannot be attained. (The
strongest intimidation, by the way, is the invention of a hereafter with a
hell everlasting.) For this purpose we must have racks and torturers of
the soul. Further grades of morality, and accordingly means to the end
referred to, are the commandments of a God (as in the Mosaic law). Still
further and higher are the commandments of an absolute sense of duty with
a “Thou shalt”—all rather roughly hewn yet _broad_ steps, because on the
finer, narrower steps men cannot yet set their feet. Then comes a morality
of inclination, of taste, finally of insight—which is beyond all the
illusory motives of morality, but has convinced itself that humanity for
long periods could be allowed no other.
45.