Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2 — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
INCURABLE.—The idealist is incorrigible: if he be thrown out of his
Heaven, he makes himself a suitable ideal out of Hell. Disillusion him,
and lo! he will embrace disillusionment with no less ardour than he
recently embraced hope. In so far as his impulse belongs to the great
incurable impulses of human nature, he can bring about tragic destinies
and later become a subject for tragedy himself, for such tragedies as deal
with the incurable, implacable, inevitable in the lot and character of
man.
24.
APPLAUSE ITSELF AS THE CONTINUATION OF THE PLAY.—Sparkling eyes and an
amiable smile are the tributes of applause paid to all the great comedy of
world and existence—but this applause is a comedy within a comedy, meant
to tempt the other spectators to a _plaudite amici_.
25.
COURAGE FOR TEDIUM.—He who has not the courage to allow himself and his
work to be considered tedious, is certainly no intellect of the first
rank, whether in the arts or in the sciences.—A scoffer, who happened for
once in a way to be a thinker, might add, with a glance at the world and
at history: “God did not possess this courage, for he wanted to make and
he made all things so interesting.”
26.
FROM THE MOST INTIMATE EXPERIENCE OF THE THINKER.—Nothing is harder for a
man than to conceive of an object impersonally, I mean to see in it an
object and not a person. One may even ask whether it is possible for him
to dispense for a single moment with the machinery of his instinct to
create and construct a personality. After all, he associates with his
thoughts, however abstract they may be, as with individuals, against whom
he must fight or to whom he must attach himself, whom he must protect,
support and nourish. Let us watch or listen to ourselves at the moment
when we hear or discover a new idea. Perhaps it displeases us because it
is so defiant and so autocratic, and we unconsciously ask ourselves
whether we cannot place a contradiction of it by its side as an enemy, or
fasten on to it a “perhaps” or a “sometimes”: the mere little word
“probably” gives us a feeling of satisfaction, for it shatters the
oppressive tyranny of the unconditional. If, on the other hand, the new
idea enters in gentle shape, sweetly patient and humble, and falling at
once into the arms of contradiction, we put our autocracy to the test in
another way. Can we not come to the aid of this weak creature, stroke it
and feed it, give it strength and fulness, and truth and even
unconditionality? Is it possible for us to show ourselves parental or
chivalrous or compassionate towards our idea?—Then again, we see here a
judgment and there a judgment, sundered from each other, never looking at
or making any movement towards each other. So we are tickled by the
thought, whether it be not here feasible to make a match, to draw a
_conclusion_, with the anticipation that if a consequence follows this
conclusion it is not only the two judgments united in wedlock but the