Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2 — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
A HEREDITARY SIN OF PHILOSOPHERS.—Philosophers have at all times
appropriated and _corrupted_ the maxims of censors of men (moralists), by
taking them over without qualification and trying to prove as necessary
what the moralists only meant as a rough indication or as a truth suited
to their fellow-countrymen or fellow-townsmen for a single decade.
Moreover, the philosophers thought that they were thereby raising
themselves above the moralists! Thus it will be found that the celebrated
teachings of Schopenhauer as to the supremacy of the will over the
intellect, of the immutability of character, the negativity of
pleasure—all errors, in the sense in which he understands them—rest upon
principles of popular wisdom enunciated by the moralists. Take the very
word “will,” which Schopenhauer twisted so as to become a common
denotation of several human conditions and with which he filled a gap in
the language (to his own great advantage, in so far as he was a moralist,
for he became free to speak of the will as Pascal had spoken of it). In
the hands of its creator, Schopenhauer’s “will,” through the philosophic
craze for generalisation, already turned out to be a bane to knowledge.
For this will was made into a poetic metaphor, when it was held that all
things in nature possess will. Finally, that it might be applied to all
kinds of disordered mysticism, the word was misused by a fraudulent
convention. So now all our fashionable philosophers repeat it and seem to
be perfectly certain that all things have a will and are in fact One Will.
According to the description generally given of this All-One-Will, this is
much as if one should positively try to have the stupid Devil for one’s
God.
6.
AGAINST VISIONARIES.—The visionary denies the truth to himself, the liar
only to others.
7.
ENMITY TO LIGHT.—If we make it clear to any one that, strictly, he can
never speak of truth, but only of probability and of its degrees, we
generally discover, from the undisguised joy of our pupil, how greatly men
prefer the uncertainty of their intellectual horizon, and how in their
heart of hearts they hate truth because of its definiteness.—Is this due
to a secret fear felt by all that the light of truth may at some time be
turned too brightly upon themselves? To their wish to be of some
consequence, and accordingly their concealment from the world of what they
are? Or is it to be traced to their horror of the all-too brilliant light,
to which their crepuscular, easily dazzled, bat-like souls are not
accustomed, so that hate it they must?
8.
CHRISTIAN SCEPTICISM.—Pilate, with his question, “What is Truth?” is now
gleefully brought on the scene as an advocate of Christ, in order to cast
suspicion on all that is known or knowable as being mere appearance, and
to erect the Cross on the appalling background of the Impossibility of
Knowledge.
9.