Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2 — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
thing, I mean the questions: “What end does man serve?” “What is his fate
after death?” “How does he make his peace with God?” and all the rest of
that bag of tricks. The problems of the dogmatic philosophers, be they
idealists, materialists, or realists, concern us as little as do these
religious questions. They all have the same object in view—to force us to
a decision in matters where neither faith nor knowledge is needed. It is
better even for the most ardent lover of knowledge that the territory open
to investigation and to reason should be encircled by a belt of fog-laden,
treacherous marshland, a strip of ever watery, impenetrable, and
indeterminable country. It is just by the comparison with the realm of
darkness on the edge of the world of knowledge that the bright, accessible
region of that world rises in value.—We must once more become good friends
of the “everyday matters,” and not, as hitherto, despise them and look
beyond them at clouds and monsters of the night. In forests and caverns,
in marshy tracts and under dull skies, on the lowest rungs of the ladder
of culture, man has lived for æons, and lived in poverty. There he has
learnt to despise the present, his neighbours, his life, and himself, and
we, the inhabitants of the brighter fields of Nature and mind, still
inherit in our blood some taint of this contempt for everyday matters.
17.
PROFOUND INTERPRETATIONS.—He who has interpreted a passage in an author
“more profoundly” than was intended, has not interpreted the author but
has obscured him. Our metaphysicians are in the same relation, or even in
a worse relation, to the text of Nature. For, to apply their profound
interpretations, they often alter the text to suit their purpose—or, in
other words, corrupt the text. A curious example of the corruption and
obscuration of an author’s text is furnished by the ideas of Schopenhauer
on the pregnancy of women. “The sign of a continuous will to life in
time,” he says, “is copulation; the sign of the light of knowledge which
is associated anew with this will and holds the possibility of a
deliverance, and that too in the highest degree of clearness, is the
renewed incarnation of the will to life. This incarnation is betokened by
pregnancy, which is therefore frank and open, and even proud, whereas
copulation hides itself like a criminal.” He declares that every woman, if
surprised in the sexual act, would be likely to die of shame, but
“displays her pregnancy without a trace of shame, nay even with a sort of
pride.” Now, firstly, this condition cannot easily be displayed more
aggressively than it displays itself, and when Schopenhauer gives
prominence only to the intentional character of the display, he is
fashioning his text to suit the interpretation. Moreover, his statement of
the universality of the phenomenon is not true. He speaks of “every
woman.” Many women, especially the younger, often appear painfully ashamed