Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 2
Nietzsche · en
have long been cured, of the eruption of life; that life on each of these
stars, measured by the period of its existence, has been but an instant, a
flicker, with long, long intervals afterwards—and thus in no way the aim
and final purpose of their existence. Possibly the ant in the forest is
quite as firmly convinced that it is the aim and purpose of the existence
of the forest, as we are convinced in our imaginations (almost
unconsciously) that the destruction of mankind involves the destruction of
the world. It is even modesty on our part to go no farther than this, and
not to arrange a universal twilight of the world and the Gods as the
funeral ceremony of the last man. Even to the eye of the most unbiassed
astronomer a lifeless world can scarcely appear otherwise than as a
shining and swinging star wherein man lies buried.
15.
THE MODESTY OF MAN.—How little pleasure is enough for the majority to make
them feel that life is good! How modest is man!
16.
WHERE INDIFFERENCE IS NECESSARY.—Nothing would be more perverse than to
wait for the truths that science will finally establish concerning the
first and last things, and until then to think (and especially to believe)
in the traditional way, as one is so often advised to do. The impulse that
bids us seek nothing but _certainties_ in this domain is a religious
offshoot, nothing better—a hidden and only apparently sceptical variety of
the “metaphysical need,” the underlying idea being that for a long time no
view of these ultimate certainties will be obtainable, and that until then
the “believer” has the right not to trouble himself about the whole
subject. We have no need of these certainties about the farthermost
horizons in order to live a full and efficient human life, any more than
the ant needs them in order to be a good ant. Rather must we ascertain the
origin of that troublesome significance that we have attached to these
things for so long. For this we require the history of ethical and
religious sentiments, since it is only under the influence of such
sentiments that these most acute problems of knowledge have become so
weighty and terrifying. Into the outermost regions to which the mental eye
can penetrate (without ever penetrating _into_ them), we have smuggled
such concepts as guilt and punishment (everlasting punishment, too!). The
darker those regions, the more careless we have been. For ages men have
let their imaginations run riot where they could establish nothing, and
have induced posterity to accept these fantasies as something serious and
true, with this abominable lie as their final trump-card: that faith is
worth more than knowledge. What we need now in regard to these ultimate
things is not knowledge as against faith, but indifference as against
faith and pretended knowledge in these matters!—Everything must lie nearer
to us than what has hitherto been preached to us as the most important