Nietzsche and Other Exponents of Individualism — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Nietzsche and Other Exponents of Individualism
Nietzsche · en
Nietzsche's so-called "real world" is one ideal among many others. It
is as much subjective as the ideals of other mortals,--of men who seek
happiness in wealth, or in pleasures, or in fame, or in scholarship,
or in a religious life--all of them imagine that the world of their
thoughts is real and the goal which they endeavor to reach is the only
thing that possesses genuine worth. In Nietzsche's opinion all are
dreamers catching at shadows, but the shadow of his own fancy appeared
to him as real.
According to Nietzsche the universe is not a cosmos but a chaos. He
says (_La Gaya Scienza_, German edition, p. 148):
"The astral order in which we live is an exception. This
order and the relative stability which is thereby caused,
made the exception' of exceptions possible,--the formation
of organisms. The character-total of the world is into all
eternity chaos, not in the sense of a missing necessity,
but of missing order, articulation, form, beauty, wisdom,
and as all our æsthetic humanities may be called."
In agreement with this conception of order, Nietzsche says of man, the
rational animal:
"I fear that animals look upon man as a being of their own
kind, which in a most dangerous way has lost the sound
animal-sense,--as a lunatic animal, a laughing animal, a
crying animal, a miserable animal." (_La Gaya Scienza_,
German edition, p. 196.)
If reason is an aberration, the brute must be superior to man and
instinct must range higher than logical thought. Man's reason,
according to this consistent nominalist view, is purely subjective and
has no prototype in the objective world. This is a feature common to
all nominalistic philosophies. John Stuart Mill regards the theorems
of logic and mathematics, not only not as truths, but as positive
untruths. He says:
"The points, lines, circles, and squares, which any one
has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the
points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in
his experience. Our idea of a point, I apprehend to be
simply our idea of the _minimum visibile_, the smallest
portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined
by geometers, is wholly inconceivable. We can reason
about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have a
power, which is the foundation of all the control we can
exercise over the operations of our minds; the power, when
a perception is present to our senses, or a conception
to our intellects, of attending to a part only of that
perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we
cannot conceive a line without breadth; we can form no
mental picture of such a line: all the lines which we have
in our minds are lines possessing breadth."