Prophets of Dissent : Essays on Maeterlinck, Strindberg, Nietzsche and Tolstoy — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Prophets of Dissent : Essays on Maeterlinck, Strindberg, Nietzsche and Tolstoy
Nietzsche · en
In cast of mind, Maeterlinck is sombrously meditative, and he has been
wise in framing his outer existence so that it would accord with his
habitual detachment. The greater part of his time used to be divided
between his charming retreat at _Quatre Chemins_, near Grasse, and the
grand old abbey of St. Wandrille in Normandy, which he managed to snatch
in the very nick of time from the tightening clutch of a manufacturing
concern. With the temperament of a hermit, he has been, nevertheless, a
keen observer of life, though one preferring to watch the motley
spectacle from the aristocratic privacy of his box, sheltered, as it
were, from prying curiosity. Well on in middle age, he is still an
enthusiastic out-of-doors man,--gardener, naturalist, pedestrian,
wheelman, and motorist, and commands an extraordinary amount of special
knowledge in a variety of sports and sciences. In "The Double Garden" he
discusses the automobile with the authority of an expert watt-man and
mechanician. In one of his other books he evinces an extraordinary
erudition in all matters pertaining to the higher education of dogs; and
his work on "The Life of the Bee" passes him beyond question with high
rank among "thirty-third degree" apiculturists.
One of the characteristics that seem to separate his books, especially
those of the earlier period, from the literary tendencies of his age, is
their surprising inattention to present social struggles. His
metaphysical bias makes him dwell almost exclusively, and with great
moral and logical consistency, on aspects of life that are slightly
considered by the majority of men yet which he regards as ulteriorly of
sole importance.
When men like Maeterlinck are encountered in the world of practical
affairs, they are bound to impress us as odd, because of this inversion
of the ordinary policies of behavior. But before classing them as
"cranks," we might well ask ourselves whether their appraisal of the
component values of life does not, after all, correspond better to their
true relativity than does our own habitual evaluation. With the average
social being, the transcendental bearing of a proposition is synonymous
with its practical unimportance. But in his essay on "The Invisible
Goodness" Maeterlinck quite properly raises the question: "Is visible
life alone of consequence, and are we made up only of things that can be
grasped and handled like pebbles in the road?"