The Genealogy of Morals: The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy. — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Genealogy of Morals: The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy.
Nietzsche · en
principles because they could not dispense with the _infliction_ of
suffering, and saw therein a magic of the first order, a veritable
bait of seduction to life.
Perhaps in those days (this is to solace the weaklings) pain did not
hurt so much as it does nowadays: any physician who has treated negroes
(granted that these are taken as representative of the prehistoric
man) suffering from severe internal inflammations which would bring
a European, even though he had the soundest constitution, almost to
despair, would be in a position to come to this conclusion. Pain has
_not_ the same effect with negroes. (The curve of human sensibilities
to pain seems indeed to sink in an extraordinary and almost sudden
fashion, as soon as one has passed the upper ten thousand or ten
millions of over-civilised humanity, and I personally have no doubt
that, by comparison with one painful night passed by one single
hysterical chit of a cultured woman, the suffering of all the animals
taken together who have been put to the question of the knife, so as
to give scientific answers, are simply negligible.) We may perhaps
be allowed to admit the possibility of the craving for cruelty not
necessarily having become really extinct: it only requires, in view
of the fact that pain hurts more nowadays, a certain sublimation and
subtilisation, it must especially be translated to the imaginative and
psychic plane, and be adorned with such smug euphemisms, that even the
most fastidious and hypocritical conscience could never grow suspicious
of their real nature ("Tragic pity" is one of these euphemisms:
another is "_les nostalgies de la croix_"). What really raises one's
indignation against suffering is not suffering intrinsically, but
the senselessness of suffering; such a _senselessness_, however,
existed neither in Christianity, which interpreted suffering into a
whole mysterious salvation-apparatus, nor in the beliefs of the naive
ancient man, who only knew how to find a meaning in suffering from
the standpoint of the spectator, or the inflictor of the suffering.
In order to get the secret, undiscovered, and unwitnessed suffering
out of the world it was almost compulsory to invent gods and a
hierarchy of intermediate beings, in short, something which wanders
even among secret places, sees even in the dark, and makes a point
of never missing an interesting and painful spectacle. It was with
the help of such inventions that life got to learn the _tour de
force_, which has become part of its stock-in-trade, the _tour de
force_ of self-justification, of the justification of evil; nowadays
this would perhaps require other auxiliary devices (for instance,
life as a riddle, life as a problem of knowledge). "Every evil is
justified in the sight of which a god finds edification," so rang the
logic of primitive sentiment--and, indeed, was it only of primitive?
The gods conceived as friends of spectacles of cruelty--oh how far