The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza"): Complete Works, Volume Ten — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza"): Complete Works, Volume Ten
Nietzsche · en
_Noble and Ignoble._--To ignoble natures all noble, magnanimous
sentiments appear inexpedient, and on that account first and foremost,
as incredible: they blink with their eyes when they hear of such
matters, and seem inclined to say," there will, no doubt, be some
advantage therefrom, one cannot see through all walls;"--they are
jealous of the noble person, as if he sought advantage by back-stair
methods. When they are all too plainly convinced of the absence of
selfish intentions and emoluments, the noble person is regarded by
them as a kind of fool: they despise him in his gladness, and laugh
at the lustre of his eye. "How can a person rejoice at being at a
disadvantage, how can a person with open eyes want to meet with
disadvantage! It must be a disease of the reason with which the noble
affection is associated";--so they think, and they look depreciatingly
thereon; just as they depreciate the joy which the lunatic derives
from his fixed idea. The ignoble nature is distinguished by the fact
that it keeps its advantage steadily in view, and that this thought
of the end and advantage is even stronger than its strongest impulse:
not to be tempted to inexpedient activities by its impulses--that is
its wisdom and inspiration. In comparison with the ignoble nature the
higher nature is _more irrational:_--for the noble, magnanimous, and
self-sacrificing person succumbs in fact to his impulses, and in his
best moments his reason _lapses_ altogether. An animal, which at the
risk of life protects its young, or in the pairing season follows the
female where it meets with death, does not think of the risk and the
death; its reason pauses likewise, because its delight in its young, or
in the female, and the fear of being deprived of this delight, dominate
it exclusively; it becomes stupider than at other times, like the noble
and magnanimous person. He possesses feelings of pleasure and pain of
such intensity that the intellect must either be silent before them, or
yield itself to their service: his heart then goes into his head, and
one henceforth speaks of "passions." (Here and there to be sure, the
antithesis to this, and as it were the "reverse of passion," presents
itself; for example in Fontenelle, to whom some one once laid the hand
on the heart with the words, "What you have there, my dearest friend,
is brain also.") It is the unreason, or perverse reason of passion,
which the ignoble man despises in the noble individual, especially
when it concentrates upon objects whose value appears to him to be
altogether fantastic and arbitrary. He is offended at him who succumbs
to the passion of the belly, but he understands the allurement which
here plays the tyrant; but he does not understand, for example, how
a person out of love of knowledge can stake his health and honour on
the game. The taste of the higher nature devotes itself to exceptional
matters, to things which usually do not affect people, and seem to have