The Twilight of the Idols; or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer. The Antichrist: Complete Works, Volume Sixteen — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Twilight of the Idols; or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer. The Antichrist: Complete Works, Volume Sixteen
Nietzsche · en
And even your atom, my dear
good Mechanists and Physicists, what an amount of error, of rudimentary
psychology still adheres to it!—Not to speak of the “thing-in-itself,”
of the _horrendum pudendum_ of the metaphysicians! The error of spirit
regarded as a cause, confounded with reality! And made the measure of
reality! And called _God!_
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_The Error of imaginary Causes._ Starting out from dreamland, we
find that to any definite sensation, like that produced by a distant
cannon shot for instance, we are wont to ascribe a cause after the
fact (very often quite a little romance in which the dreamer himself
is, of course, the hero). Meanwhile the sensation becomes protracted
like a sort of continuous echo, until, as it were, the instinct of
causality allows it to come to the front rank, no longer however as a
chance occurrence, but as a thing which has some meaning. The cannon
shot presents itself in a _causal_ manner, by means of an apparent
reversal in the order of time. That which occurs last, the motivation,
is experienced first, often with a hundred details which flash past
like lightning, and the shot is the _result._ What has happened? The
ideas suggested by a particular state of our senses, are misinterpreted
as the cause of that state. As a matter of fact we proceed in precisely
the same manner when we are awake. The greater number of our general
sensations—every kind of obstacle, pressure, tension, explosion in
the interplay of the organs, and more particularly the condition of
the _nervus sympathies_—stimulate our instinct of causality: we will
have a reason which will account for our feeling thus or thus,—for
feeling ill or well. We are never satisfied by merely ascertaining
the fact that we feel thus or thus: we admit this fact—we become
conscious of it—only when we have attributed it to some kind of
motivation. Memory, which, in such circumstances unconsciously becomes
active, adduces former conditions of a like kind, together with the
causal interpretations with which they are associated,—but not their
real cause. The belief that the ideas, the accompanying processes
of consciousness, have been the causes, is certainly produced by
the agency of memory. And in this way we become _accustomed_ to a
particular interpretation of causes which, truth to tell, actually
hinders and even utterly prevents the investigation of the proper
cause.
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