A marginal note to a _niaiserie anglaise_: "Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation. The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the _"Principe"_ in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone which enable us to steal a march on others,--and which deprive others of the power of doing the same to us"?--On the other hand, let us remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the probability of getting one, does not deter him from vindicating his honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in general. Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a certain _type of man_: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as I am to thee so art thou to me.--In this community equivalence of actions is really believed in--an equivalence which never under any circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the victim of another action. 926.