The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
The _blind yielding_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or
hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character
does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a
man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them
by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control,
but merely because....
929.
"To give up one's life for a cause"--very effective. But there are many
things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all,
will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger,
or to revenge--it matters not from the point of view of value. How
many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what
is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively
chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for
instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is
virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing,
another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the
contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in
danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to
be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk
nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.----A man
always sacrifices something.
930.
How many _advantages_ does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent
does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to
assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious
utility which consists in personal profit!
A man does _not_ strive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to
be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our
desires long to violate things with passion--their overflowing strength
seeks obstacles.
931.
All passions are generally _useful,_ some directly, others indirectly;
in regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any
gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general
may be regarded as good (_i.e._ useful), from an economic point of
view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that
the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger
sources of power exist.
932.
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have _not_
come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they
are the conditions peculiar to _rich souls_ who are able to bestow
and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the
eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of
self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.
933.
_In short,_ what we require is to dominate the passions and not to
weaken or to extirpate them!--The greater the dominating power of the
will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.