[Footnote 3: The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a passage in his _Life of Napoleon_ (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche had made a note in another place, and which reads: "Une croyance presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand il parle et à plus forte raison quand il écrit."] _(h)_ Against Causality. 545. I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time as things in themselves do not exist. "Changes" are only appearances (or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence, however regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that it has always happened so. The feeling that _post hoc_ is _propter hoc,_ is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"! 546. The interpretation of a phenomenon, _either_ as an action _or_ as the endurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the suffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation, presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, _who_ is "altered." 547. Psychological history of the concept _subject._ The body, the thing, the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at length left the "subject" over. 548. Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a _cause_; as, for instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little word "I." A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a _cause of seeing in itself_: this was the feat in the invention of the "subject" of the "ego." 549. "Subject," "object," "attribute"--these distinctions have been _made,_ and are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a quality. 550. In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause and effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that faith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as subjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject of some sort.