_To combat determinism and teleology._--From the fact that something happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it does not follow that it happens _necessarily._ If a quantity of force determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular case, it does not prove that it has "no free will." "Mechanical necessity" is not an established fact: it was _we_ who first read into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of _formularising_ phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined thing, that I am bound to do it. _Compulsion_ cannot be demonstrated in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we fancied the existence of subjects "_agents_" in things, the notion arose that all phenomena are the _consequence_ of a _compulsory force_ exercised over the subject--exercised by whom? once more by an "agent." The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one, so long as people believe in something that _causes,_ and a something that is _caused._ _(a)_ Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation. *** _(b)_ When it is understood that the "subject" is nothing that _acts,_ but only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows. Only with the subject as model we invented _thingness_ and read it into the pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the _acting_ subject, the belief in _acting_ things, in reciprocal action, in cause and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces. In this case the world of _acting atoms_ also disappears: for this world is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that subjects are necessary. Ultimately, of course, _the "thing-in-itself"_ also disappears: for at bottom it is the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we have seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but in this way the concept "_appearance_" also disappears. *** _(c)_ If we abandon the idea of the acting _subject,_ we also abandon the _object_ acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena are apparently durable--they are distinguishable, for instance, by the different tempo with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed --loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means of which _differences of degree_ only are expressed; from a certain limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error over all things). ***