The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
A plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call
"Life." To this nutritive process all so-called feeling, thinking,
and imagining belong as means--that is to say, (1) in the form of
opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces
according to mould and rhythm; (3) the form of a valuation relative to
assimilation and excretion.
642.
The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the
repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. "Life" might be
defined as a lasting form of _force-establishing processes,_ in which
the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what
extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is
by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in
the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute
power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated.
"Obedience," and "command," are forms of the game of war.
643.
The Will to Power _interprets_ (an organ in the process of formation
has to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations,
differences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of
each other as such: something must be there which _will_ grow, and
which interprets all other things that would do the same, according to
the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpretation is but a means
in itself to become master of something. (Continual _interpretation_ is
the first principle of the organic process.)
644.
Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of the
developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate
members--if _that_ is _perfection,_ then there is a Will to Power
apparent in the organic process by means of whose _dominating,
shaping,_ and _commanding_ forces it is continually increasing the
sphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that
sphere, it _grows_ imperatively.
"Spirit" is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher
life, in the service of the elevation of life.
645.
"_Heredity,_" as something quite incomprehensible, cannot be used
as an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification
of a problem. And the same holds good of "_adaptability._" As a
matter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were
perfect, _explains_ nothing, it merely describes an enormous fact.
_How_ a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not
explained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things
by the assumption of _causæ finales_ as by the assumption of _causæ
efficientes._ The concept "causa" is only a means of expression, no
_more_; a means of designating a thing.
646.