The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
"Pain" and "pleasure" are the most absurd _means of expressing_
judgments, which of course does not mean that the judgments which are
enunciated in this way must necessarily be absurd. The elimination
of all substantiation and logic, a yes or no in the reduction to a
passionate desire to have or to reject, an imperative abbreviation, the
utility of which is irrefutable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin
is in the central sphere of the intellect; its prerequisite is an
infinitely accelerated process of perceiving, ordering, co-ordinating,
calculating, concluding: pleasure and pain are always final phenomena,
they are never causes.
As to deciding what provokes pain and pleasure, that is a question
which depends upon the _degree of power:_ the same thing, when
confronted with a small quantity of power, may seem a danger and may
suggest the need of speedy defence, and when confronted with the
consciousness of greater power, may be a voluptuous stimulus and may be
followed by a feeling of pleasure.
All feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose a _measuring of collective
utility_ and _collective harmfulness_: consequently a sphere where
there is the willing of an object (of a condition) and the selection of
the means thereto. Pleasure and pain are never "original facts."
The feelings of pleasure and pain are _reactions of the will_
(emotions) in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain
supervening changes as a collective value, and also as an introduction
of contrary actions.
670.
_The belief in "emotions"_--Emotions are a fabrication of the
intellect, an invention of _causes_ which do not exist. All general
_bodily sensations_ which we do not understand are interpreted
intellectually--that is to say, a _reason_ is sought why we feel
thus or thus among certain people or in certain experiences. Thus
something disadvantageous dangerous, and strange is taken for granted,
as if it were the cause of our being indisposed; as a matter of fact,
it gets _added to_ the indisposition, so as to make our condition
thinkable.--Mighty rushes of blood to the brain, accompanied by
a feeling of suffocation, are _interpreted_ as anger: the people
and things which provoke our anger are a means of relieving our
physiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain
processes and general feelings are so regularly correlated that the
sight of certain processes provokes that condition of general feeling,
and induces vascular engorgements, the ejection of seminal fluid, etc.:
we then say that the "emotion is provoked by propinquity."
_Judgments_ already inhere in pleasure and pain: stimuli become
differentiated, according as to whether they increase or reduce the
feeling of power.