The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche · en
_Concerning the value of "Becoming."_--If the movement of the world
really tended to reach a final state, that state would already have
been reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does
not tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific
hypothesis (_e.g._ materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this
fact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Booming must appear justified at every instant (or it
must defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must
not under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the
past be justified for the sake of the present. "Necessity" must not
be interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force
or as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some
valuable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,--a "God," in order that life may not be
veiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and
yet _wills_ nothing: "God" is useless if he wants nothing; and if he
do want something, this presupposes a general sum of suffering and
irrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortunately
any such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking
everything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the
greatest indictment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of Being must be allowed to
remain,--because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why
was it obliged to originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that
there was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning
Being is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against
the world (the "Better world," the "True world" the "World Beyond," the
"Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability.
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance, the world of Being is
probably only appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value at every instant; the sum
of its value always remains equal: expressed otherwise, it has no
value; for that according to which it might be measured, and in regard
to which the word value might have some sense, is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies valuation; for this reason
philosophical pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the judges of existence!
Neither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (_e.g._ mind) the
"absolute" which stands behind evolution!
710.