More’s original enthusiasm for Descartes declined as he understood better that the Cartesian world in practice excluded spirits and souls. Because Descartes could find no necessary place even for God Himself, More styled him, in _Enchiridion Metaphysicum_ (1671), the “Prince of the Nullibists”; these men “readily acknowledge there are such things as _Incorporeal Beings_ or _Spirits_, yet do very peremptorily contend, that they are _no where_ in the whole World [;] . . . because they so boldly affirm that a Spirit is _Nullibi_, that is to say, _no where_,” they deserve to be called _Nullibists_.[5] In contrast to these false teachers, More describes absolute space by listing twenty epithets which can be applied either to God or to pure extension, such as “Unum, Simplex, Immobile . . . Incomprehensible       ”[6] There is, however, a great difficulty here; for while Space and Spirit are eternal and uncreated, they yet contain material substance which has been created by God. If the material world possesses infinite extension, as More generally believes, that would preclude any need of its having a creator. In order to avoid this dilemma, which _Democritus Platonissans_ ignores, More must at last separate matter and space, seeing the latter as an attribute of God through which He is able to contain a finite world limited in space as well as in time. In writing that “this infinite space because of its infinity is distinct from matter,”[7] More reveals the direction of his conclusion; the dichotomy it embodies is Cartesianism in reverse.