SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? MENO: I quite agree. SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? MENO: True. SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly. MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable? MENO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? MENO: I think not. SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state? MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction? MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught. SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right. SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always. MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue? SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples? MENO: Surely. SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?