In p. 293, he also observes, “that perfectly accurate arguments, and such as are truly scientific, are not to be expected in physical discussions, but such as are assimilated to them. It is besides this requisite to know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers, and an intellectual and divine essence; for “physical works, as the [Chaldean] Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father;” thus, also, the discussion of the world makes a commixture of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from sense participate largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intelligibles, possess that which is irreprehensible, and cannot be confuted.” And, lastly, in p. 296, he adds, “that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility; for, to the knowledge of them we require imagination, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly contain these in their unity and divine intellection; for, in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which, for the most part, takes place on account of the instability of their subject matter. But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectural, through employing sense and material instruments. On this account we must be satisfied with proximity in the apprehension, of them, since we dwell remotely at the bottom, as it is said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from different hypotheses; some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phænomena.” Shuttleworth, in his Astronomy, has demonstrated that the celestial phænomena may be solved by the hypotheses of Ptolemy and Tycho Brahe, equally as well as by those of Copernicus. But astronomers of the present day, from not being skilled in the logic of Aristotle, are not aware that true conclusions may be deduced from false premises; and hence, because their theory solves the phænomena, they immediately conclude that it is true. Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics, has incontrovertibly shown, that the things from which demonstrative science consists, must be necessarily true, the causes of, more known than, and prior to the conclusion. But where the premises of a syllogism are false, the conclusion is not _scientifically_, i. e. _necessarily_, true. Thus in the syllogism, Every stone is an animal; every man is a stone; therefore every man is an animal,—the conclusion is true, but not _scientific_.