Ocellus Lucanus on the nature of the universe : $b Taurus, the Platonic philosopher, on the eternity of the world. Julius Firmicus Maternus of the thema mundi. Select theorems on the perpetuity of time, by Proclus. — Plato — John Shaqi
Ocellus Lucanus on the nature of the universe : $b Taurus, the Platonic philosopher, on the eternity of the world. Julius Firmicus Maternus of the thema mundi. Select theorems on the perpetuity of time, by Proclus.
Plato · en
In that part of the world, however, in which nature and generation
predominate, it is necessary that the three following things[15] should
be present. In the first place, the body which yields to the touch,
and which is the subject of all generated natures. But this will be an
universal recipient, and a signature of generation itself, having the
same _relation_ to the things that are generated from it, as water to
taste, _silence to sound_[16], darkness to light, and the matter of
artificial forms to the forms themselves. For water is tasteless and
devoid of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet and the bitter,
the sharp and the salt. Air, also, which is formless with respect to
sound, is the recipient of words and melody. And darkness, which is
without colour, and without form, becomes the recipient of splendour,
and of the yellow colour and the white; but whiteness pertains to the
statuary’s art; and to the art which fashions figures from wax. Matter,
however, has a relation in a different manner to the statuary’s art; for
in matter all things prior to generation are in capacity, but they exist
in perfection when they are generated and receive their proper nature.
Hence matter [or a universal recipient] is necessary to the existence of
generation.
The second thing which is necessary, is the existence of contrarieties,
in order that mutations and changes in quality may be effected, matter
for this purpose receiving passive qualities, and an aptitude to the
participation of forms. Contrariety is also necessary, in order that
powers, which are naturally mutually repugnant, may not finally vanquish,
or be vanquished by, each other. But these powers are the hot and the
cold, the dry and the moist.
Essences rank in the third place; and these are fire and water, air and
earth, of which the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, are powers.
But essences differ from powers; for essences are locally corrupted by
each other, but powers are neither corrupted nor generated, for the
reasons [or forms] of them are incorporeal.
Of these four powers, however, the hot and the cold subsist as causes and
things of an effective nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter
and things that are passive[17]; but matter is the first recipient of
all things, for it is that which is in common spread under all things.
Hence, the body, which is the object of sense in capacity, and ranks as a
principle, is the first thing; but contrarieties, such as heat and cold,
moisture and dryness, form the second thing; and fire and water, earth
and air, have an arrangement in the third place. For these change into
each other; but things of a contrary nature are without change.