But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I here briefly prepare the reader. Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident--or conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination--there is no capacity of explaining to others--there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed--nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts generated by traditional or other authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings.[1] [Footnote 1: Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste fin--interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf Thermidor. "_C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé_," répondait Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.--(Hippolyte Carnot--Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)] Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice--next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof--of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient--and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be _reasoned truth_; supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.