Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141 Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this man is never seen or identified 142 We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage _ib._ Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a general explanation 143 Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage _ib._ Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of Lachês 144 Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145 Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage 146 Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is _ib._ No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end 147 Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists 148 Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends _ib._ Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue 149 Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150 CHAPTER XIX. CHARMIDES. Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates 153 Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154 But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness _ib._ Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates _ib._ Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155 Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge. _ib._