Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagês is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est". He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagês, has been copied from a passage in the Theætêtus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætêtus and the Theagês. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\n o( theo\s parei/kê|] (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagês--131 A, [Greek: e)a\n me\n parei/kê| ê(mi=n--to\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque [Greek: o( theo\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster tenebrio_ protenus illud dæmonium, quod Socrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiæ gradum evexit, ut, &c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o( theo\s] in the Theætêtus has substantially the same meaning as [Greek: to\ daimo/nion] in the Theagês. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase [Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], [Greek: to\ thei=on], are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/môn], [Greek: o( theo/s]. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\s] and [Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek: daimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\ daimo/nion (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) [Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: ê( ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\ ê( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on], where Sokratis dæmonium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such