Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for
discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all
times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before
Sokrates--probably no one before Plato--ever sought a definition of it.
In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a
special topic of research.
[Side-note: Definition of philosophy--here sought for the
first time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered.]
It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner.
By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as
equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least
Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist,
contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by
Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any
standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be
measured, introduces that governing idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion]
(the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which
Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The
conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement--and of
conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and
desirable--stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always
handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês,
indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best:
without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be
hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is
neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained
intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is
called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the
person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental
training--neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To
suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to
leave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with Plato. In this
respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any,
intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence
is the philosopher himself.
[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic
dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.]
[Footnote 23: See about [Greek: ê( tou= metri/ou phu/sis] as [Greek:
ou)si/a]--as [Greek: o)/ntôs gigno/menon].--Plato, Politikus,
283-284. Compare also the Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp.
356-357, where [Greek: ê( metrêtikê\ te/chnê] is declared to be the
principal saviour of life and happiness.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.]
[Side-note: View taken of the second-best critical talking
man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.]