Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering 285 Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose 287 The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288 Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack _ib._ Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289 Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290 Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291 Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292 Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it 293 To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294 Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295 Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible _ib._ Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras 297 Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates 298 Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299 Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates _ib._ Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry 300 Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301 Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out _ib._ Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner 303 Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction _ib._ Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere _ib._