[Footnote 21: Plato, Charm. 170-171. 171 C: [Greek: Panto\s a)/ra ma=llon, ei) ê( sôphrosu/nê e)pistê/mês e)pisê/mê mo/non e)sti\ kai\ a)nepistêmosu/nês, ou)/te i)atro\n diakri=nai oi(/a te e)/stai e)pista/menon ta\ tê=s te/chnês, ê)\ mê\ e)pista/menon prospoiou/menon de\ ê)\ oi)o/menon, ou)/te a)//lon ou)de/na tô=n e)pistame/nôn kai\ o(tiou=n, plê/n ge to\n au(tou= o(mo/technon, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi dêmiourgoi/.]] [Side-note: Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value.] But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us (continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to know respecting others, how much _they_ know, and how much they do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,--we should commit to others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know. But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have we found any science which does.[22] How temperance benefits us, does not yet appear. [Footnote 22: Plato, Charm. 172 A. [Greek: o(ra=|s, o(/ti ou)damou= e)pistê/mê ou)demi/a toiau/tê ou)=sa pe/phantai.]] [Side-note: But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness.] But let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to others to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion (continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great benefit.[23] It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined) would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?[24] [Footnote 23: Plato, Charm. 172-173.]