Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of each separate and special science: so that the temperate man (_i.e._ he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain fashion.[30] Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned out to be thoroughly unprofitable. [Footnote 30: Plato, Charm. 175 B. [Greek: kai\ ga\r e)pistê/mên e)pistê/mês ei)=nai xunechôrê/samen, ou)k e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou ou)de\ pha/skontos ei)=nai; kai\ tau/tê| au)= tê=| e)pistê/mê| kai\ ta\ tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n e)/rga gignô/skein xunechôrê/samen, ou)de\ tou=t' e)ô=ntos tou= lo/gou, i(/na dê\ ê(mi=n ge/noito o( sô/phrôn e)pistê/môn ô(=n te oi)=den, o(/ti oi)=de, kai\ ô(=n mê\ oi)=den, o(/ti ou)k oi)=de. tou=to me\n dê\ kai\ panta/pasi megaloprepô=s xunechôrê/samen, ou)d' e)piskepsa/menoi to\ a)du/naton ei)=nai a(/ tis mê\ oi)=de mêdamô=s, tau=ta ei)de/nai a(mô=s ge/ pôs; o(/ti ga\r ou)k oi)=de, phêsi\n au)ta\ ei)de/nai ê( ê(mete/ra o(mologi/a. kai/toi, ô(s e)gô=mai, ou)deno\s o(/tou ou)chi\ a)logô/teron tou=t' a)\n phanei/ê.] This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle. See Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 28.] [Side-note: Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is remains unknown.] It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates) do not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you, Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias cannot discover what it is?[31] [Footnote 31: Plato, Charm. 176 A.] * * * * * [Side-note: Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout.]