Yet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances: when, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless evil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body in itself is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil clinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to the medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the evil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere superficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the essential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained, the body ceases to be indifferent (_i.e._, neither good nor evil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which determines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own nature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.[18] [Footnote 18: Plato, Lysis, 217 E: [Greek: To\ mê/te kako\n a)/ra mê/t' a)gatho\n e)ni/ote kakou= paro/ntos ou)/pô kako/n e)stin, e)/sti d' o(/te ê)/dê to\ toiou=ton ge/gonen. Pa/nu ge. Ou)kou=n o(/tan mê/pô lalo\n ê(=| kakou= paro/ntos, au)tê\ me\n ê( parousi/a a)gathou= au)to\ poiei= e)pithumei=n, ê( de\ kako\n poiou=sa a)posterei= au)to\ tê=s t' e)pithumi/as a)/ma kai\ tê=s phili/as ta)gathou=. Ou) ga\r e)/ti e)sti\n ou)/te kako\n ou)/t' a)gatho/n, a)lla\ kako/n; phi/lon de\ a)gathô=| kako\n ou)k ê)=n.]] [Side-note: Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance.] Under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher--the friend or lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom: nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is engrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary. The philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has ignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he knows his own ignorance, and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.[19] [Footnote 19: Plato, Lysis, 218 A. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta dê\ phai=men a)\n kai\ tou\s ê)/dê sophou\s mêke/ti philosophei=n, ei)/te theoi\ ei)/te a)/nthrôpoi/ ei)sin ou(=toi; ou)d' au)= e)kei/nous philosophei=n tou\s ou(/tôs a)/gnoian e)/chontas ô(/ste kakou\s ei)=nai; kako\n ga\r kai\ a)mathê= ou)de/na philosophei=n. lei/pontai dê\ oi( e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\n tou=to, tê\n a)/gnoian, mê/pô de\ u(p' au)tou= o)/ntes a)gnô/mones mêd' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti ê(gou/menoi mê\ ei)de/nai a(\ mê\ i)/sasin. dio\ dê\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ pô o)/ntes. o(/soi de\ kakoi\, ou) philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare Plato, Symposion, 204.]