Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Plato · en
[Side-note: Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new
suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us,
_per se_: by relation or resemblance to which other objects
become dear.]
The two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation
heartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with
it. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and
Menexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to
delusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all
friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something:
it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective
end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes
when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which
is an evil--and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical
art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing
behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain
that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and
that we must come ultimately to something which is dear _per
se_, not from reference to any ulterior _aliud_. We must come
to some _primum amabile_, dear by its own nature, to which all
other dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.[20] It
is this _primum amabile_ which is the primitive, essential, and
constant, object of our affections: we love other things only from
their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly
attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which
wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize
highly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the
cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that
he prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son: for the truth is,
that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends
only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So
about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver--but
this is incorrect, for what we really prize is not gold, but the
ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold
and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms--when
we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A
under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of
love, _primum amabile_, towards which all the affections which
we bear to other things, refer and tend.[21]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Lysis, 219 C-D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n ou)k
a)na/gkê a)peipei=n ê(ma=s ou(/tôs i)o/ntas, kai\ a)phike/sthai e)pi/
tina a)rchê\n, ê)\ ou)ke/t' e)panoi/sei e)p' a)/llo phi/lon, a)ll'
ê(/xei e)p' e)kei=no o(/ e)sti _prô=ton phi/lon_, ou(= e(/neka
kai\ ta)/lla phame\n pa/nta phi/la ei)=nai?]]