Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Müller's translation of Plato, p. 268) calls this a "sophistisches Räthselspiel"; and he notes other portions of the dialogue which "remind us of the deceptive tricks of the Sophists" (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see p. 222-224-227-230). He praises Plato here for his "fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the Sophists". Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word [Greek: phi/los], he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man Menexenus. The confusion between [Greek: e(/neka/ tou] and [Greek: dia/ ti] (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists. I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's reasoning.] [Footnote 23: Plato, Lysis, 221 E. [Greek: To\ e)pithumou=n ou(= a)\n e)ndee\s ê)=|, tou/tou e)pithumei=--e)ndee\s de\ gi/gnetai ou(= a)/n tis a)phairê=tai--tou= oi)kei/ou dê/, ô(s e)/oiken, o(/ te e)/rôs kai\ ê( phili/a kai\ ê( e)pithumi/a tugcha/nei ou)=sa.] This is the same doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a myth with comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposion, pp. 191-192-193. [Greek: e(/kastos ou)=n ê(mô=n e)/stin a)nthrô/pou su/mbolon, a)/te tetmême/nos ô(/sper ai( psê=ttai e)x e(no\s du/o. zêtei= dê\ a)ei\ to\ au)tou= e(/kastos xu/mbolon] (191 D)--[Greek: dikai/ôs a)\n u(mnoi=men E)/rôta, o(\s e)/n te tô=| paro/nti plei=sta ê(ma=s o)ni/nêsin ei)s to\ oi)kei=on a)/gôn], &c. (193 D).] [Footnote 24: Plato, Lysis, 221-222.] [Side-note: Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down.] But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like? We must assume that there is: for we showed before, that like was useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature foreign to every one? If so, then there can be no friendship except between one good man and another good man. But this too has been proved to be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike unsuccessful. [Side-note: Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue.] In this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about to ask assistance from some of the older men around. But the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their pupils home--the hour being late. As the youths were departing I said to them--Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that we have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as well as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring, that we fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but that we have not yet been able to find out what a friend is.[25] [Footnote 25: Plato, Lysis, 223 B. [Greek: Nu=n me\n katage/lastoi gego/namen e)gô/ te, gerô\n a)nê/r, kai\ u(mei=s], &c.]