[Footnote 21: Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. [Greek: O(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la ei)=nai ê(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/rô| r(ê/mati phaino/metha le/gontes _au)to/_; phi/lon de\ _tô=| o)/nti_ kinduneu/ei _e)kei=no au)to\_, ei)s o(\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleutô=sin.]] [Side-note: The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own.] Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our _primum amabile_, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?[22] This cannot be: because even if all evil were banished, the appetites and desires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still remain: and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to us. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being dear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being loved--desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as he desires: he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he is in want of that which has been taken away from him--of his own.[23] It is therefore this _own_ which is the appropriate object of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and Menexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred nature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless there were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or affinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary law, that which has a natural affinity to us; so that the real and genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his beloved.[24] [Footnote 22: Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter Plato runs into a confusion between [Greek: to\ dia/ ti] and [Greek: to\ e(/neka/ tou], which two he began by carefully distinguishing. Thus in 218 D he says, [Greek: o( phi/los e)sti\ tô| phi/los--e(/neka/ tou kai\ dia/ ti.] Again 219 A, he says--[Greek: to\ sô=ma tê=s i)atrikê=s phi/lon e)sti/n, _dia\ tê\n no/son, e(/neka tê=s u(giei/as_.] This is a very clear and important distinction. It is continued in 220 D--[Greek: o(/ti _dia\ to\ kako\n_ ta)gatho\n ê)gapô=men kai\ e)philou=men, ô(s pha/rmakon o)\n tou= kakou= to\ a)gatho/n, to\ de\ kako/n no/sma.] But in 220 E--[Greek: to\ de\ tô=| o)/nti phi/lon pa=n tou)nanti/on tou/tou phai/netai pephuko/s; _phi/lon ga\r ê(mi=n a)nepha/nê o(\n e(chthrou= e(/neka_.] To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before, these two last words ought to be exchanged for [Greek: dia\ to\ e)chthro/n]. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved--[Greek: dia\ to\ kako/n], not [Greek: e(/neka tou= kakou=]. Good is loved on _account of evil_, but for _the sake of obtaining_ a remedy to or cessation of the evil.