[Footnote 42: Plato, Lysis, 220 B. [Greek: o(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la ei)=nai ê(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/rô| r(ê/mati phaino/metha le/gontes au)to/; phi/lon de\ tô=| o)/nti kinduneu/ei e)kei=no au)to\ ei)=nai, ei)s o(\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleutô=sin.]] [Footnote 43: There is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites. The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill in his 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the Intellect,--Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq. (3rd ed. p. 363 seq.).] [Side-note: Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion.] The _primum amabile_, here introduced by Sokrates, is described in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as having no value _per se_, if evil were assumed not to exist. In consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is.[44] The Platonic Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther--yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be [Greek: lego/menon kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n]. [Footnote 44: Plato, Republ. vi. pp. 505-506.]