But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon common relationship towards some [Greek: A)rchê\]--First Principle or First Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was designated by Aristotle under the title [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], as contrasted with [Greek: kata\ ge/nos]: the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not [Greek: kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin] or [Greek: pro\s e(/n]:[45] it was affirmed neither entirely [Greek: sunônu/môs] (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely [Greek: o(mônu/môs] (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.[46]