Virtue then (continues Sokrates)--that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide--consists in knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of _quasi-knowledge_, which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the mind.[25] It is this right opinion, or _quasi-knowledge_, which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been shown that they cannot do.[26] They deliver true opinions and predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not wise or knowing.[27] [Footnote 25: Plato, Menon, p. 99 A. [Greek: ô(=| de\ a)/nthrôpos ê(gemô/n e)stin e)pi\ to\ o)rtho/n, du/o tau=ta, do/xa a)lêthê\s kai\ e)pistê/mê.]] [Footnote 26: Plato, Menon, p. 99 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra sophi/a tini\ ou)de\ sophoi\ o)/ntes oi( toiou=toi a)/ndres ê(gou=nto tai=s po/lesin, oi( a)mphi\ Themistokle/a. . . . dio\ kai\ ou)ch oi(=oi/ te a)/llous poiei=n toiou/tous oi(=oi au)toi/ ei)sin, a(/te ou) di' e)pistê/mên o)/ntes toiou=toi.]] [Footnote 27: Plato, Menon, p. 99 D. [Greek: kai\ tou\s politikou\s ou)ch ê(/kista tou/tôn phai=men, a)\n thei/ous te ei)=nai kai\ e)nthousia/zein, e)pi/pnous o)/ntas kai\ katechome/nous e)k tou= theou=, o(/tan katorthô=si le/gontes polla\ kai\ mega/la pra/gmata, mêde\n ei)do/tes ô(=n le/gousin.]] [Side-note: All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods.] And thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon--"Whether virtue is teachable?"--is as follows. Virtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or coincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists. That which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name of virtue,--or at least producing the results of virtue in practice--is not teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special inspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot make any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do this, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing compared with a shadow.[28] [Footnote 28: Plato, Menon, p. 100.] [Side-note: But what virtue itself is, remains unknown.] Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--"How virtue arises or is generated?"--must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question--"What is virtue?"--has been investigated and brought to a solution.[29] [Footnote 29: Plato, Menon, p. 100 B.] * * * * *