Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Plato · en
Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine.
Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification
368
Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet
feebly applied--in this dialogue 369
What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic.
Comparison 370
Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known,
while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers
about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes
ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently _ib._
Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the
answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests 371
Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The
alternative which he tenders has no fair application 372
Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is
an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with
Pleasure, except some other End 373
The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and
diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing
agency 374
Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by
Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value.
This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis 375
Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance
of pain 377
The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They included
both in their acknowledged End _ib._
Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The Hedonists
enforced the same reasonable view 378
Different points of view worked out by Plato in different
dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False Pleasures
379
Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and
Rhetoric 380
Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same principle of
classification--true and false--to Cognitions and Pleasures 382
Distinction of true and false--not applicable to pleasures _ib._
Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the
Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why 385
Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon
his own admission, against his opponents--the Pleasure-haters, who
disallowed pleasures altogether 387
Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these
Pleasure-haters 389
Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philêbus
391
Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the
Protagoras _ib._
How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items it is
applied 393
Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to
Cognitions 394
Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other
dialogues 395
Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good 397
Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in
respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally 398
CHAPTER XXXIII.
MENEXENUS.