Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
pursuits: accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of
honour are shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher;
while the lover of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures
of philosophy. In the range of personal experience, therefore, the
philosopher surpasses the other two: he surpasses them no less in
exercised intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his
own principal instrument.[293] If wealth and profit furnished the
proper means of judgment, the money-lover would have been the best
judge of the three: if honour and victory furnished the proper
means, we should consult the lover of honour: but experience,
intelligence, and rational discourse, have been shown to be the
means--and therefore it is plain that the philosopher is a better
authority than either of the other two. His verdict must be
considered as final. He will assuredly tell us, that the pleasures
belonging to the love of knowledge are the greatest: those
belonging to the love of honour and power, the next: those
belonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.[294]
[Footnote 290: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.]
[Footnote 291: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a|
te kai\ phronê/sei kai\ lo/gô|.]]
[Footnote 292: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.]
[Footnote 293: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. [Greek: lo/goi de\
tou/tou ma/lista o)/rganon.]]
[Footnote 294: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.]
[Side-note: They are the only pleasures completely true and
pure. Comparison of pleasure and pain with neutrality. Prevalent
illusions.]