I have thus refuted (continues Sokrates) the case of those who contend--That the unjust man is a gainer by his injustice, provided he could carry it on successfully, and with the reputation of being just. I have shown that injustice is the greatest possible mischief, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and apart from public reputation: inasmuch as it enslaves the better part of the mind to the worse. Justice, on the other hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it keeps the worse parts of the mind under due controul and subordination to the better.[306] Vice and infirmity of every kind is pernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under subjection to the worst.[307] No success in the acquisition of wealth, aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate a man for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own mind by becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate, with the better part governing the worse, is the first of all objects: greater even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful body.[308] To put his mind into this condition, and to acquire all the knowledge thereunto conducing, will be the purpose of a wise man's life. Even in the management of his body, he will look not so much to the health and strength of his body, as to the harmony and fit regulation of his mind. In the acquisition of money, he will keep the same end in view: he will not be tempted by the admiration and envy of people around him to seek great wealth, which will disturb the mental polity within him:[309] he will, on the other hand, avoid depressing poverty, which might produce the same effect. He will take as little part as possible in public life, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities as at present constituted--nor in any other than the model-city which we have described.[310] [Footnote 306: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.] [Footnote 307: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 590 B-C.] [Footnote 308: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.] [Footnote 309: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D-E. [Greek: kai\ to\n o)/gkon tou= plê/thous ou)k, e)kplêtto/menos u(po\ tou= tô=n pollô=n makarismou=, a)/peiron au)xê/sei, a)pe/ranta kaka\ e)/chôn . . . A)ll' a)poble/pôn ge, pro\s tê\n e)n au(tô=| politei/an, kai\ phula/ttôn mê/ ti parakinê=| au)tou= tô=n e)kei= dia\ plê=thos ou)si/as ê)\ di' o)ligo/têta, ou(/tô kubernô=n prosthê/sei kai\ a)nalô/sei tê=s ou)si/as, kath' o(/son a)\n oi(=o/s t' ê)=|.]] [Footnote 310: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 592.] [Side-note: Tenth Book--Censure of the poets is renewed--Mischiefs of imitation generally, as deceptive--Imitation from imitation.]