Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
region in which alone it resides. Their pleasures, though seeming
intense, and raising vehement desires in their uninstructed minds,
are yet only phantoms deriving a semblance of pleasure from
contrast with pains:[303] they are like the phantom of Helen, for
which (as Stesichorus says) the Greeks and Trojans fought so many
battles, knowing nothing about the true Helen, who was never in
Troy.
[Footnote 301: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B. [Greek: Plê/rôsis
de\ a)lêtheste/ra tou= ê(=tton ê)\ tou= ma=llon o)/ntos? Dê=lon
o(/ti tou= ma=llon. Po/tera ou)=n ê(gei= ta\ ge/nê ma=llon
kathara=s ou)si/as mete/chein, ta\ oi(=on si/tou kai\ potou= kai\
o)/psou kai\ xumpa/sês trophê=s, ê)\ to\ do/xês te a)lêthou=s
ei)=dos kai\ e)pistê/mês kai\ nou= kai\ xullê/bdên xumpa/sês
a)retê=s?]]
[Footnote 302: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 E.]
[Footnote 303: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.]
[Side-note: Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of
Appetite and Ambition, when measured against those of
Intelligence.]
The pleasures belonging to the Love of Honour (Energy or Passion)
are no better than those belonging to the Love of Money
(Appetite). In so far as the desires belonging to both these
departments of mind are under the controul of the third or best
department (Love of Wisdom, or Reason), the nearest approach to
true pleasure, which it is in the nature of either of them to
bestow, will be realised. But in so far as either of them throws
off the controul of Reason, it will neither obtain its own truest
pleasures, nor allow the other departments of mind to obtain
theirs.[304] The desires connected with love, and with despotic
power, stand out more than the others, as recusant to Reason. Law,
and Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are most obedient
to this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore, will enjoy
the least pleasure: the kindly-minded man will enjoy the most. Of
the three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two bastard,
the despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the farthest
limit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that of
the kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come the
oligarchical and the democratical man. The difference between
the two extremes** is as 1: 729.[305]
[Footnote 304: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.]
[Footnote 305: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.]
[Side-note: The Just Man will be happy from his justice--He
will look only to the good order of his own mind--He will stand
aloof from public affairs, in cities as now constituted.]