wrong to others, and renders to others the full service which they have a right to require, whatever hardship it may impose upon himself. A man is called just or unjust, according to his conduct towards others. [Footnote 62: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367.] [Footnote 63: See the instructive chapter on the Moral Sense, in Mr. James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 280. "The actions from which men derive advantage have all been classed under four titles--Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. . . When those names are applied to our own acts, the first two, Prudent and Brave, express acts which are useful _to ourselves_, in the first instance: the latter two, Just and Beneficent, express acts which are useful _to others_, in the first instance. . . It is further to be remarked, that those acts of ours which are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily useful to others; and those which are primarily useful to others, are secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus, it is by our own prudence and fortitude that we are best enabled to do acts of justice and beneficence to others. And it is by acts of justice and beneficence to others, that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us."] [Footnote 64: Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 1280, b. 10, [Greek: o( no/mos sunthê/kê, kai\ katha/per e)/phê Luko/phrôn o( sophistê/s, e)gguêtê\s a)llê/lois tô=n dikai/ôn.] Chrysippus also, writing against Plato, maintained that [Greek: a)diki/a] was essentially [Greek: pro\s e(/teron, ou) pro\s e(auto/n] (Plutarch, Stoic. Repugnant. c. 16, p. 1041 D).] [Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. [Greek: kai\ o(mologei=n Thrasuma/chô| o(/ti to\ me\n di/kaion, a)llo/trion a)gatho/n, xumphe/ron tou= krei/ttonos; to\ de\ a)/dikon, au)tô=| me\n xumphe/ron kai\ lusitelou=n, tô=| de\ ê(/ttoni, a)xu/mphoron.]] [Side-note: Plato in Republic is preacher, inculcating useful beliefs--not philosopher, establishing scientific theory. State of Just and Unjust Man in the Platonic Commonwealth.]