In considering the main thesis of the Republic, we must look upon Plato as preacher--inculcating a belief which he thinks useful to be diffused; rather than as philosopher, announcing general truths of human nature, and laying down a consistent, scientific, theory of Ethics. There are occasions on which even he himself seems to accept this character. "If the fable of Kadmus and the dragon's teeth" (he maintains) "with a great many other stories equally improbable, can be made matters of established faith, surely a doctrine so plausible as mine, about justice and injustice, can be easily taught and accredited."[66] To ensure unanimous acquiescence, Plato would constrain all poets to proclaim and illustrate his thesis--and would prohibit them from uttering anything inconsistent with it.[67] But these or similar official prohibitions may be employed for the upholding of any creed, whatever it be: and have been always employed, more or less, in every society, for the upholding of the prevalent creed. Even in the best society conceivable under the conditions of human life, assuming an ideal commonwealth in which the sentiments of _just_ and _unjust_ have received the most systematic, beneficent, and rational embodiments, and have become engraven on all the leading minds--even then Plato's first assertion--That the just man is happy _quand même_--could not be admitted without numerous reserves and qualifications. Justice must still be done by each agent, not as a self-inviting process, but as an obligation entailing more or less of sacrifice made by him to the security and comfort of others. Plato's second assertion--That the unjust man is miserable--would be more near the truth; because the ideal commonwealth is assumed to be one in which the governing body has both the disposition and the power to punish injustice--and the discriminating equanimity, or absence of antipathies, which secures them against punishing anything else. The power of society to inflict misery is far more extensive than its power of imparting happiness. But even thus, we have to recollect that the misery of the unjust person arises not from his in justice _per se_, but from consequent treatment at the hands of others. [Footnote 66: See Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664. Good and simple people, in the earlier times (says Plato) believed every thing that was told them. They were more virtuous and just then than they are now (Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E).] [Footnote 67: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 661-662. Illustrated in the rigid and detailed censorship which he imposes on the poets in the Republic, in the second and third books.