In the Legg., however, Plato puts his thesis in a manner less untenable than in the Republic:--"Neither to do wrong to others, nor to suffer wrong from others; this is the happiest condition" (Legg. ii. p. 663 A). This is a very different proposition from that which is defended in the Republic; where we are called upon to believe, that the man who acts justly will be happy, whatever may be the conduct of others towards him. Epikurus laid down, as one of the doctrines in his [Greek: Ku/riai Do/xai] (see Diog. Laert. x. 150): [Greek: To\ tê=s phu/seôs di/kaion e)sti\ su/mbolon tou= sumphe/rontos, ei)s to\ mê\ bla/ptein a)llê/lous mêde\ bla/ptesthai. O(/sa tô=n zô/|ôn mê\ ê)du/nato sunthê/kas poiei=sthai ta\s u(pe\r tou= mê\ bla/ptein a)/llêla mêde\ bla/ptesthai, pro\s tau=ta ou)the/n e)stin ou)de\ di/kaion ou)/de\ a)/dikon. Ô(sau/tôs de\ kai\ tô=n e)thnô=n o(/sa mê\ ê)du/nato, ê)\ mê\ e)bou/leto, ta\s sunthê/kas poiei=sthai ta\s u(pe\r tou= mê\ bla/ptein a)llê/lous mêde\ bla/ptesthai], &c. Lucretius expresses the same--v. 1020:-- "Tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere aventes "Finitimi inter se nec _lædere nec violari_," &c.] [Side-note: Comparative happiness of the two in actual communities. Plato is dissatisfied with it--This is his motive for recasting society on his own principles.] Thus much for the Platonic or ideal commonwealth. But when we pass from that hypothesis into the actual world, the case becomes far stronger against the truth of both Plato's assertions. Of actual societies, even the best have many imperfections--the less good, many attributes worse than imperfections:--"_ob virtutes certissimum exitium_". The dissenter for the better, is liable to be crucified alongside of the dissenter for the worse: King Nomos will tolerate neither. [Side-note: Confusion between the preacher and the philosopher in the Platonic Republic.]