[Footnote 6: Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. "Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind."] [Footnote 7: Plato, Repub. iv. p. 433 A. [Greek: kai\ mê\n o(/ti ge to\ ta\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\ mê\ polupragmonei=n dikaiosu/nê e)sti/, kai\ tou=to _a)/llôn te pollô=n a)kêko/amen_, kai\ au)toi\ polla/kis ei)rê/kamen.] Compare iii. p. 406 E.] [Footnote 8: See Charmidês, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this passage:--"A _sophistis_ ergo vulgata hæc [Greek: sôphrosu/nês] definitio: ad _justitiam_ quoque ab iisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De Officiis, i. 9, 2. Item ad _prudentiam_, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526)." The definition given in the Charmidês appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was "a sophistis vulgata," and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.] From whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical classification--Virtue as a whole, distributed into four varieties--1. Prudence or Knowledge--2. Courage or Energy--3. Temperance--4. Justice--we find it here placed in the foreground of his doctrine, respecting both the collective Commonwealth and the individual man.[9] He professes to understand and explain what they are--to reason upon them all with confidence--and to apply them to very important conclusions. [Footnote 9: In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: [Greek: ê( o(sio/tês] is included also; see Lachês, p. 199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not advert to [Greek: to\ o(/sion] in the Republic as a separate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p. 427 B).] [Side-note: All the four are here assumed as certain and determinate, though in former dialogues they appear indeterminate and full of unsolved difficulties.]