Here, for the first time in Ethical Theory, Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice, are assumed as an exhaustive enumeration of virtues: each distinct from the other three, but all together including the whole of Virtue.[4] Through Cicero and others, these four have come down as the cardinal virtues. From whom Plato derived it, I do not know: not certainly from the historical Sokrates, who resolved the last three into the first.[5] Nor is it indeed in harmony with Plato's own view: for temperance and justice are substantially coincident, in his explanation of them (since he does not recognise the characteristic feature of Justice, as directly tending to the good of a person other than the agent): and the line, by which he endeavours to part them, is obscure as well as unimportant. Schleiermacher--who admits that the distinction drawn here between Temperance and Justice is altogether forced--supposes that Plato took up this quadruple classification, because he found it already established in the common, non-theorising, consciousness.[6] If this be true, the real distinction between Justice (as directly bearing on the rights of another person) and Temperance (as directly concerning only the future happiness of the agent himself), which is one of the most important distinctions in Ethics--must have been already felt, without being formulated, in the common mind: and Plato, by retaining the two words, but effacing the distinction between the two, and giving a new meaning to Justice--took a step in the wrong direction. He himself however tells us, that the definition, here given of Justice, is not his own; but that he had heard it enunciated by many others before him.[7] What makes this more remarkable is, That the same definition (to do your own business and not to meddle with other people's business) is what we read in the Charmidês as delivered respecting Temperance, by Charmides and Kritias:[8] delivered by them, and afterwards pulled to pieces in cross-examination by Sokrates. Herein we see farther proof how little distinction Plato drew between Justice and Temperance. [Footnote 4: Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. [Greek: to\ _de\ dê\ loipo\n ei)=dos_, di' o(\ a)\n e)/ti a)retê=s mete/choi po/lis, ti/ pot' a)\n ei)/ê? dê=lon ga\r o(/ti _tou=to/_ e)stin ê( _dikaiosu/nê_.] Compare p. 444 D, where he defines [Greek: A)retê/--A)retê\ me\n a)/ra, ô(s e)/oiken, u(gi/eia te/ tis a)\n ei)/ê kai\ ka/llos kai\ eu)exi/a psuchê=s; kaki/a de\, no/sos te kai\ ai)=schos kai\ a)sthe/neia.]] [Footnote 5: Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. [Greek: sophi/an de\ kai\ sôphrosu/nên ou) diô/rizen], &c. Compare the discussion of [Greek: sôphrosu/nê], iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it ensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of which he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be intemperate.]