Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
At this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by
Simonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes
up the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry,
self-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length
of insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic
vivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view
the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities
which Homer heaps upon Thersites in the Iliad.[12] But how far it
is a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.
[Footnote 12: Homer, Iliad B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the
reader should compare Spengel--[Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]--pp.
94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the
Republic.]
[Side-note: Violence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of
Sokrates--Conditions of useful colloquy.]
In the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives
valuable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. "What
nonsense is all this!" (exclaims Thrasymachus). "Do not content
yourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much
easier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give
us a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right--or
profitable--or for our interest--or gainful--or advantageous: for
I will not listen to any trash like this." "Be not so harsh with
us, Thrasymachus" (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). "If we
have taken the wrong course of inquiry, it is against our own
will. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger." "I
thought" (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) "that you
would have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would
decline answering." _S._--How can I possibly answer, when you
prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask
men--How much is twelve? and at the same time say--Don't tell
me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times
three--how can any man answer your question? _T._--As if the two
cases were similar! _S._--Why not similar? But even though
they be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can
he help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether
we forbid him or not? _T._--Is that what you intend to do?
Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade?
_S._--Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me
the proper answer.[13] _T._--What will you say if I show you
another answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then
impose upon yourself? _S._--What penalty?--why, that which
properly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn
from men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am
prepared for.[14]