Here Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is dissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is every way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion, and desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. "You know" (he says), "Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good--1. Good, _per se_, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to ulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior consequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence, &c. 3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment, professional business, &c. Now in which of these branches do you rank Justice?" _S._--I rank it in the noblest--that is--in the second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason of its consequences. _G._--Most persons put it in the third branch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving to be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which attaches to the man who is reputed just.[29] _S._--I know that this is the view taken by Thrasymachus and many others: but it is not mine. _G._--Neither is it mine. [Footnote 29: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.] [Side-note: Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against Sokrates, though professing not to agree with it.] Yet still I think that you have not made out your case against Thrasymachus, and that he has given up the game too readily. I will therefore re-state his argument, not at all adopting his opinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full refutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any one. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature and origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise justice, practise it unwillingly; not as good _per se_, but as a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their part is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will follow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of the just.[30] [Footnote 30: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.] [Side-note: Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of a compromise for all--a medium between what is best and what is worst.]