Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4 — Plato — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Plato · en
I must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies
and training through which these preservers Rulers of our city,
the complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among
the Guardians, after having been tested by years of exercises
and temptations of various kinds, will occupy that distinguished
place. Very few will be found uniting those distinct and almost
incompatible excellences which qualify them for the post. They
must give proof of self-command against pleasures as well as
pains, and of competence to deal with the highest studies.[186]
But what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of
knowledge? It is the Idea of Good--the Form of Good: to the
acquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend,
however laborious and difficult the process may be.[187] Neither
justice nor any thing else can be useful or profitable, unless we
superadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it
would profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.[188]
[Footnote 186: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.]
[Footnote 187: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.]
[Footnote 188: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A. [Greek: o(/ti ge ê(
tou= a)gathou= i)de/a me/giston ma/thêma polla/kis a)kê/koas, ê)=|
di/kaia kai\ ta)/lla proschrêsa/mena chrê/sima kai\ ô)phe/lima
gi/gnetai], &c.]
[Side-note: Ancient disputes upon this point, though every
one yearns after Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure.
Neither is satisfactory.]
Now as to the question, What Good is? there are great and
long-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does every thing
for the sake of it--yet without either knowledge or firm assurance
what Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving
benefit from other acquisitions.[189] Most people say that
Pleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with
the Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For
when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question
to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you
mean?--Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence
of the Good: which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already
what the Good is--the very point which he is pretending to elucidate.
Again, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in
discussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures:
in other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes
bad.[190] From these doubts and disputes about the real nature
of good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have
emancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They
will be unfit for their post it they do not well know what the
Good is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be
good.[191] Our city will have received its final consummation,
when it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what
the Good is.