20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The
first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state
of being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is
seeking to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the
things of the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in
these aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in
modern times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind,
the other from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using
this argument Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the
body, with the soul of the good and wise. (Compare Republic.) Such a
confusion was natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul
and body. The soul in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with
virtues and graces, were easily interchanged with one another, because
on a subject which passes expression the distinctions of language can
hardly be maintained.
21. The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the
necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their
evil deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus,
an Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of
their crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is
accomplished Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless
he felt that it was easier to improve than to invent, and that in
religion especially the traditional form was required in order to give
verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far more probable to that
age than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as 'one guess among
many' about the nature of the earth, which he cleverly supports by the
indications of geology. Not that he insists on the absolute truth of
his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be confident in such
matters; but he will be confident that something of the kind is true.'
As in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins belief for
his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like
Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations.