Platonism in English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — Plato — John Shaqi
Platonism in English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
Plato · en
“Then gin I thinke on that which Nature sayd,
Of that same time when no more _Change_ shall be,
But stedfast rest of all things firmely stayd
Upon the pillours of Eternity,
That is contrayr to _Mutabilitie_:
For, all that moveth, doth in _Change_ delight:
But thenceforth all shall rest eternally.
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight:
O Thou great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that Sabaoths sight.”
(VII. viii. 2.)
In the theory of the preëxistence of the soul and in the conception of
the indestructibility of matter Vaughan and Spenser were able to find
teachings which were akin to the most intimate experiences of their
lives. Although the phase of Platonic idealism which taught in these two
distinct ways the eternity of human life and of the world about us did
not have so vital an influence upon English poetry as did the opening of
a world of moral beauty, its presence is nevertheless indicative of the
strong hold which Platonism had upon some of the finest poetic minds of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England. Even when these
poets were writing from the fulness of their own personal experience, it
was in the moulds of Platonic philosophy that their thought was cast.
The elements of Platonism, then, that enter into the English poetry of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have their source in the
dialogues of Plato and the “Enneads” of Plotinus. The body of this
teaching—its æsthetics, its metaphysics, and its ethics—was seen by the
poets in its relation to Christian doctrine and to the passion of
romantic love. The more permanent results for good are found in the
fusion of Platonism with the ideals of Christian living and with its
longing for perfection. If one passage in Plato may adequately sum up
the teaching of Platonism most influential in English poetry, it is the
passage in “Phædrus” in which the beauty of wisdom is taught (“Phædrus,”
250).
But beauty in its stricter import is a thing known to the sense, and is
carried over into the moral world only to indicate the value of moral
ideas. Plato recognized this; and in this connection it is significant
that in the part of “Phædrus,” where he speaks of the loveliness of
wisdom, he is aware of the power of pure beauty. “But of beauty,” he
says, “I repeat again that we saw her there [in the ideal world] shining
in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her
here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense.
For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses; though not by that
is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had
been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible
counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of
beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight”
(250).